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Do we need a theory of legitimate 
expectations? 
 
Joe Tomlinson 
 
In recent years, it has become common to see claims that the doctrine of legitimate expectations 
has no sufficiently defined purpose and that administrative law scholars should do more 
WKHRUHWLFDOZRUNWREULQJFRKHUHQFHWRWKLVDUHDRIODZ,QWKLVDUWLFOH,VXJJHVWWKLV¶FRQFHSWXDO
FULWLTXH· RI OHJLWLPDWH H[SHFWDWLRQV LV PLVSODFHG DQG WKDW LQVWHDG LW UHYHDOV D PXFK ZLGHU
failing of contemporary administrative law scholarship. First, I show how there has not yet 
been, and is unlikely to be, a satisfactory answer to the conceptual critique. Following on from 
this conclusion, I suggest that the assumptions underlying the conceptual critique are faulty 
and administrative lawyers need to fundamentally alter and expand how they study legitimate 
expectations. The aim now, I argue, must be to move towards providing an account of the 
practice of legitimate expectations in the wider context of public administration. My specific 
argument in this article is thus a case for a significant reorientation and an expansion of the 
study of how law protects legitimate expectations, but the wider suggestion is that the same 
shift is required in administrative law scholarship generally. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Is there a convincing account of the purpose of protecting legitimate expectations 
through administrative law? It has become almost de rigueur in recent years to suggest 
that there is not, and to suggest scholars need to do more theoretical work to 
compensate for this.1 This article responds to two influential articulations of this 
¶FRQFHSWXDOFULWLTXH·RIOHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQV2 In particular, it traces the prominent 
arguments of Christopher Forsyth and Paul Reynolds, both of whom suggest that the 
doctriQHZRXOGEHDVVLVWHGE\LGHQWLILFDWLRQRIVRPHVRUWRI¶PHWD-YDOXH·WKDWFDQRIIHU
 
 Senior Lecturer in Public Law, University of York; Research Director, Public Law Project. Much of the 
research underpinning this article was undertaken as part of a project funded by a University of 
0DQFKHVWHU3UHVLGHQW·V6FKRODUVKLS,DPYHU\JUDWHIXOWo Robert Thomas and Javier Garcia Oliva for 
many extensive and helpful discussions. I am also grateful to Adam Tucker, Adam Perry, Paul Daly, 
*UDKDP*HH(OL]DEHWK2·/RXJKOLQ5LFKDUG.LUNKDPDQGWKHDQRQ\PRXVUHYLHZHUVIRUGHWDLOHGDQG
valuable comments. The usual disclaimers apply. 
1 35H\QROGV¶/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH3URWHFWLRQRI7UXVWLQ3XEOLF2IILFLDOV·>@3/
&)RUV\WK ¶/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQV5HYLVLWHG·>@-5 -:DWVRQ ¶&ODULW\DQG$PELJXLW\$
New Approach to thH 7HVWRI /HJLWLPDF\ LQ WKH /DZ RI /HJLWLPDWH ([SHFWDWLRQV·   Legal 
Studies 633. 
2 This label is used as shorthand for the particular critique elaborated by these scholars as the core 
concern seems to be lack of a guiding concept.  
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useful guidance on controversial questions related to legitimate expectations.3 By 
sifting through each of the prominent accounts³found in both case law and 
scholarship³of the doctrine, I show that none of them manage to satisfy the 
FRQGLWLRQVLPSOLFLWZLWKLQWKHFULWLTXHRIZKDWD¶JRRG·WKHRU\RIOHJLWLPDWHRXJKWWR
do. I therefore suggest that, instead, we need to revisit some of the assumptions of the 
critique; namely, that there is a pressing need for the type of theory scholars such as 
Reynolds and Forsyth propose, and that there is a pressing need in this area for more 
theory at all. I argue that both assumptions are faulty. If we are to theorise about 
legitimate expectations then, what I will refer to as, a value pluralist approach is 
preferable. Taking this approach, there is much less to worry about in the state of the 
current law than those who adopt the conceptual critique appear to suggest. 
Furthermore, I argue there is no pressing need for more theory in this area of 
administrative law. If anything, contemporary administrative law scholarship is 
disproportionately dominated by a focus on both common law judicial principles and 
abstract debates: the debate around the conceptual critique is an artefact of this state 
of affairs. The pressing need is not for more theory, but for an account of the practice 
of legitimate expectations in the wider context of public administration. My specific 
argument in this article is a case for a significant reorientation and an expansion of the 
study of how law protects legitimate expectations, but my wider suggestion is that the 
same shift is required in administrative law scholarship generally.4 
  
My argument here is structured around two broad tasks: explaining how there 
has been no satisfactory answer to the conceptual critique so far; and explaining why 
the assumptions underlying the conceptual critique are faulty and why administrative 
lawyers need to alter and expand how they study legitimate expectations. I take up 
the first of these tasks in the first four parts of the article. In part one, I introduce the 
conceptual critique. I also the set out what the conceptual critique implies a good 
theory of legitimate expectations ought to do. Parts two and three analyse accounts of 
the doctrine which can be extracted from contemporary judgments and scholarship 
respectively. Part four analyses the preferred account of both Reynolds and Forsyth: 
that maintaining trust in government is the purpose of the doctrine. Through 
discussing various accounts of the doctrine, I demonstrate how no account can satisfy 
WKH FRQFHSWXDO FULWLTXH·V FRQGLWLRQV IRU D JRRG WKHRU\ RI OHJLWLPDWH H[SHFWDWLRQV³
even the account of the doctrine offered by those who advance the critique does not 
 
3 ,QWKLVFRQWH[WD¶PHWD-YDOXH·LVDVROHYDOXHWKDWUHSUHVHQWVWKHRYHUDUFKLQJDQGGLVWLQFWSXUSRVHWKDW
the doctrine serves within public law³a value which can also offer guidance as to how difficult 
questions concerning the doctrine ought to be resolveG7KHWHUPLVUHIHUUHGWRLQ3'DO\¶$3OXUDOLVW
$FFRXQW RI 'HIHUHQFH DQG /HJLWLPDWH ([SHFWDWLRQV· LQ 0 *URYHV DQG * :HHNV HGV Legitimate 
Expectations in the Common Law World (Oxford: Hart Bloomsbury, 2016), p.111. 
4 The claim substantiated fully here pertains to legitimate expectations specifically. While it is suggested 
that this is indicative of a wider pattern of thought in administrative law scholarship, a much wider 
argument would be necessary to substantiate that claim fully. 
3 
 
achieve this. In the final two parts of this article I take up the second task. In part five, 
I argue, in contrast to Reynolds and Forsyth, that if we are to build a theory of 
legitimate expectations then a value pluralist approach to legitimate expectations 
ought to be preferred. In the final part of the article, I argue that recent administrative 
law scholarship has focused excessively on both abstract theory and common law 
principles of judicial review. Given these two imbalances, I suggest there is no 
pressing need to argue for more theory in administrative law³at very least, there is 
no pressing need for more theory in respect of legitimate expectations. Instead, the 
scholarship requires an understanding the practice of legitimate expectations in the 
wider context of public administration. 
 
THE CONCEPTUAL CRITIQUE  
 
Since the landmark case of Coughlan, which recognised the protection of substantive 
expectations, there has been an intense debate across the common law world about 
whether the development of legitimate expectations is to be welcomed,5 and the case 
ODZUHPDLQVDVRXUFHRI ¶FRQWLQXLQJFRQWURYHUV\·6It is this long-running debate, or 
perhaps a fatigue from perceived lack of progress in the debate, from which the 
conceptual critique emerged. As Forsyth puts it: 
 
7RGD\ ZH DUH RYHUZKHOPHG E\ WKH GHFLGHG FDVHV DV ZHOO DV WKH VFKRODUO\ ZULWLQJ«
notwithstanding those many judgments and the acres of scholarly writing, we have made little 
SURJUHVV«WKHUHLVDUHDOGDQJHUWKDWthe concept of legitimate expectation will collapse into an 
inchoate justification for judicial intervention... it seems to me that the time has come to return 
to fundamentals. So we should ask fundamental questions about the justification and the task 
of the concept of legitimate expectations.7 
 
Much of the possible criticism of legitimate expectations now represents well-trodden 
territory for academics, but this particular criticism³that the doctrine suffers from the 
absence of a clearly identified purpose³has, however, not been so thoroughly 
examined. This is so even though more and more scholars have referred to this 
concern in recent years.8 Such concerns have also been reflected in the Court of 
Appeal. In a 2005 decision, Laws LJ stated that he was left unfulfilled by the present 
conceptual understanding of the doctrine (referring to the understanding of the 
GRFWULQH DV DQ LQVWUXPHQW RI ¶IDLUQHVV· WKDW H[LVWHG WR SURWHFW DJDLQVW WKH ¶DEXVH RI
 
5 See generally, 0(OOLRWW´From Heresy to Orthodoxy: Substantive Legitimate Expectations in English 
3XEOLF/DZµLQ0*URYHVDQG*:HHNVHGVLegitimate Expectations in the Common Law World (Oxford: 
+DUW-7RPOLQVRQ´7KHQDUURZDSSURDFKWRVXEVWDQWLYHOHJLtimate expectations and the trend 
RIPRGHUQDXWKRULW\µOxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 75. 
6 United Policyholders Group v Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago [2016] UKPC 17 [79-81]. 
7 )RUV\WK´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQV5HYLVLWHGµ>@-5429-430. 
8 3'DO\´$3OXUDOLVW$FFRXQWRI'HIHUHQFHDQG/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVµS 
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SRZHU·/DZV/-VWDWHGDIWHUDSSO\LQJWKH¶IDLUQHVVDPRXQWLQJWRDQDEXVHRISRZHU·
WHVWWKDW¶LWYHU\XQVDWLVIDFWRU\WROHDYHWKHFDVHWKHUH7KHFRQFOXVLRQLVQRWPHUHO\
VLPSOHEXWVLPSOLVWLF,WLVOLWWOHGLVWDQFHIURPDSXUHO\VXEMHFWLYHDGMXGLFDWLRQ«,WLV
superficial because in truth it reYHDOVQRSULQFLSOH·9 For Laws LJ, a clearer account of 
WKHGRFWULQHSXUSRVHRQHWKDW¶OLHVEHWZHHQWKHRYHUDUFKLQJUXEULFRIDEXVHRISRZHU
and the concrete imperatives of a rule-ERRN·10 was required to ¶PRYH WKH ODZ·V
development a little further down tKH URDG·11 If these broad lines of thought are 
correct then it follows, some scholars claim, that the doctrine risks becoming a 
¶VHPDQWLF ODEHO WRR HDVLO\ RSHQ WR EHLQJ DUJXHG DQG SHUKDSV DSSOLHG LQ HQWLUHO\
LQDSSURSULDWHFDVHV·12  
 
This article challenges this conceptual critique on multiple fronts. First, 
however, it is important to explain precisely what I take the conceptual critique to 
PHDQDQGKRZ,ZLOODVVHVVYDULRXVDFFRXQWVRIWKHGRFWULQH·VSXUSRVH7KHGLVFXVVLRQ
here focuses on the critiques of Christopher Forsyth and Paul Reynolds, both of whom 
suggest separately that the doctrine would be assisted by identification of some sort 
RI¶PHWD-YDOXH·DVWKLVZRXOGRIIHUXVHIXOJXLGDQFHRQFRQWURYHUVLDOTXHVWLRQVUHODWHG
to the doctrine. It focuses on the work of Forsyth and Reynolds for three key reasons. 
First, theirs is the most widely-cited and most developed versions of the critique. 
Second, they take a substantially similar approach³referencing and supporting each 
other in their accounts. Third, it is important when engaging with a widely-adopted 
argument not to combine multiple scholars and create a strawman.13  
 
The conceptual critique, as articulated by Reynolds and Forsyth, suggests that 
a theory of legitimate expectations ought to comply with certain conditions. Though 
they do not always explicitly state what type of theory they seek, these criteria are 
evident in the arguments they put forward. The criteria which can be extracted from 
their critique are, broadly stated, that: the theRU\KDVWRILWWKHSUHVHQWGRFWULQH·VUROH
at least in some broad sense; the theory has to show some fidelity to existing legal 
principle; the theory has to be able to provide practical guidance in cases; and the 
WKHRU\ DV WR EH EDVHG RQ RQH ¶PHWD-YDOXH· or overarching purpose.14 While these 
 
9 R (on the application of Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 
[67]. 
10 Ibid [67]. 
11 Ibid [67]. 
12 5H\QROGV´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH3URWHFWLRQRI7UXVWLQ3XEOLF2IILFLDOVµ>@3/
335. 
13 0 7DJJDUW ´3UROHJRPHQRQ WR DQ ,QWHOOHFWXDO +LVWRU\ RI $GPLQLVWUDWLYH /DZ LQ WKH 7ZHQWLHWK
Century: The Case of John Willis and Canadian AdministrDWLYH/DZµOsgoode Hall Law 
Journal 223, p.230. 
14 7KHVHSRLQWVFDQDOOEHLQIHUUHGIURP5H\QROGV´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH3URWHFWLRQRI7UXVW
LQ3XEOLF2IILFLDOVµ>@3/DQG)RUV\WK´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQV5HYLVLWHGµ>@ J.R. 429. 
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criteria are not defined closely, they provide a sense of what is to be valued in a theory 
according to Reynolds and Forsyth.15 In the next three parts of this article, I assess 
whether any accounts of the purpose of legitimate expectations provided by the 
judiciary and scholars meet these broad criteria. My argument is that none of the 
accounts considered meet these criteria and, as a result, we ought to revisit the key 
assumptions underpinning the conceptual critique.  
 
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTS 
 
Since the early days of the doctrine, the judiciary has, on occasion, offered various 
views on the purpose of protecting of legitimate expectations (in particular, Laws LJ 
has made various contributions from the Court of Appeal in recent years). Since the 
early 1980s onwards, the judiciary has justified the doctrine primarily by reference to 
three ideas. First, within contemporary English jurisprudence, legitimate expectations 
are perhaps most widely understood as a basic principle of fairness.16 There are many 
cases where fairness is referenced as a justification for the protection of procedural 
legitimate expectations throughout the 1980s.17 As the courts toiled with the notion of 
substantively protecting expectations throughout the 1990s, the fairness conception 
was progressively extended beyond its initial procedural form in order to 
accommodate the protection of substantive expectations.18 To this day, the notion of 
fairness is referenced heavily in legitimate expectations judgments, justifying the 
position set out in de Smith that legitimate expectation is most widely understood as 
D¶EDVLFSULQFLSOHRIIDLUQHVV·19 Second, an account which has become prominent from 
the mid-1990s onwards, though it appears to be of earlier origin, holds that the 
doctrine exists to prevent the abuse of power. The core of this account is that legitimate 
expectations ought to be protected as to do otherwise would be to allow the state to 
abuse its powers, which it ought to exercise in the public interest.20 The abuse of power 
account quickly became more pervasive in legitimate expectations cases as 
substantive protection was being recognised and developed by the courts. Reference 
to abuse of power is, much like fairness, now commonplace in judgments. Indeed, it 
is now common to hear the two ideas run together, with a court asking: is the public 
 
15 This set of criteria are similar to the criteria set out in: S.A. Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford: OUP, 1993), 
Ch.1 (discussing the criteria of fit, coherence, morality, and transparency). 
16 Attorney General of Hong-Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629; Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister 
for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 415 (Lord Roskill), 412 (Lord Diplock). 
17 For instance, see: R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p MFK Underwriting Agents [1989] STC 873. 
18 e.g. R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] Q.B. 213. 
19 H. Woolf,  J. Jowell, A. Le Sueur, C. Donnelly and I. Hare, GH6PLWK·V-XGLFLDO5HYLHZ (London: 7th edn 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2013), p.662. 
20 Coughlan [2001] Q.B. 213 [57]; R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex p Preston [1985] AC 835 [71]; R v 
Secretary of State for Education ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115, 1129; Nadarajah [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 [52]. 
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DXWKRULW\·VFRQGXFWVRXQIDLUDVWRDPRXQWWRDQDEXVHRISRZHU"21 A third prominent 
account is that the protection of legitimate expectations is a requirement of good 
administration.22 Laws LJ has offered the most developed version of this account, 
VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW JRRG DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ UHTXLUHV WKDW ¶SXEOLF ERGLHV« GHDO
VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGO\ DQG FRQVLVWHQWO\ ZLWK WKH SXEOLF·23 Good administration is, he 
argued, is akin to the right to a fair trial and the principle of no punishment without 
law.24   
 
 The main criticism advanced, including by Reynolds and Forsyth, about each 
of these accounts is that they do not tell us what distinguishes legitimate expectations 
cases from other cases, i.e. they do not define sufficiently the purpose of the doctrine. 
7KHYDOXH ¶DGGHG· WRDGPLQLVWUDWLYH ODZSURWHFWLRQVE\WKHGRFWULQH LVPRVWYLVLEOH
and most significant when an expectation founds the basis for court protecting a 
claimant who can establish no other basis for protection i.e. where the legitimate 
expectation is the sole reason for protection.25 A convincing account of legitimate 
expectations must explain this distinctiveness, so the criticism goes. None of the 
accounts of the doctrine found in the case law achieve this. They are, instead, general 
justifications for public law protections³or what Paul Daly calls administrative law 
¶PLVVLRQVWDWHPHQWV·26³but explain little if anything about the particular significance 
of protecting expectations induced by public bodies.27 In other words, the 
¶SURPLVFXLW\·28 RIWKHVHFRQFHSWVFDQEHVDLGWROHDYHWKHGRFWULQHZLWKRXW¶DQ\UHDO
 
21 This was the question asked in Coughlan [2001] Q.B. 213 [78] (Lord Woolf MR). See also: R. (Parents 
for Legal Action Ltd) v Northumberland County Council [2006] EWHC 1081 (Admin) [68]; R. (Bancoult) v 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2008] UKHL 61 [135]; Paponette & Ors v 
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (Trinidad and Tobago) [2010] UKPC 32 [32]. The implication of 
these dicta, on a plain language reading at least, appears to be that abuse of power account of the 
doctrine presents a higher threshold for claimants than unfairness. It would seemingly follow from this 
that the abuse of power account is somehow narrower than the fairness account. There is, however, no 
clear dicta on this point. 
22 Nadarajah [2005] EWCA Civ 1363; Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629; Council of Civil Service Unions [1985] 
AC 374, 401; R. (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 
755; Bancoult (No 2) [2008] UKHL 61 [182]; R (on the application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2011] UKSC 12 [311-312]; R (on the application of British Medical Association) v General Medical 
Council [2008] EWHC 2602 (Admin). 
23 Nadarajah [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 [68]. 
24 Ibid [68]. 
25 Moules, Actions Against Public Officials: Legitimate Expectations, Misstatements and Misconduct (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), p.49. See also 3(OLDV´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQG-XGLFLDO5HYLHZµLQ-
Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), New Directions in Judicial Review (London: Stevens, 1988), p.40-42. 
26 3DXO'DO\GHVFULEHV´PLVVLRQVWDWHPHQWVµDVDWWHPSWV´WRIRUPXODWHDJHQHUDOSULQFLSOHWKDWXQLILHV
disparate strands of case-ODZµDSUDFWLFHWKDWKHVHHVDV´DWWUDFWLYHµEXW´IDFLOHµVHH3'DO\´7KH
/DQJXDJHRI$GPLQLVWUDWLYH/DZµ(2016) 94 Canadian Bar Review 519. 
27 7KLVFRPSODLQWLVZHOODUWLFXODWHGE\5H\QROGV´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH3URWHFWLRQRI7UXVW
LQ3XEOLF2IILFLDOVµ>@3/ 
28 )$KPHGDQG$3HUU\´7KH&RKHUHQFHRI WKH'RFWULQHRI/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVµ
C.L.J. 61, 69. 
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FRQWHQW·29 Recently, in Gallaher, the Supreme Court made a similar point, stating 
¶>V@XFK language adds nothing to the RUGLQDU\ SULQFLSOHV RI MXGLFLDO UHYLHZ·30 
Curiously, it was this criticism that appears to have given cause for Laws LJ to advance 
good administration as an alternative account of the doctrine.31 However, the very 
same criticism can be levelled at that explanation.  
 
Another line of criticism that has been developed by Forsyth and Reynolds is 
that the accounts of the doctrine in the case law do not offer practical guidance as to 
how legitimate expectations cases ought to be decided. Laws LJ has persistently 
articulated this complaint too. In reference to the abuse of power account, he stated in 
the Begbie FDVH WKDW ¶>W@KH GLIILFXOW\ DQG DW RQFH WKHUHIRUH WKH FKDOOHQJH >LV@ LQ
WUDQVODWLQJWKLVURRWFRQFHSWRUILUVWSULQFLSOHLQWRKDUGFOHDUODZ·32 The core of the 
complaint here is that the present understandings of the purpose of the doctrine in the 
case law are playing no useful role in identifying whether the court should intervene 
or not in any given case.33 Thus, so the criticism goes, when the courts state that they 
are protecting expectations on the basis of ensuring fairness or preventing the abuse 
of power etc., WKH\DUHLQHVVHQFHPDNLQJZKDW5H\QROGVKDVODEHOHGD¶FRQFOXVRU\
VWDWHPHQW·DERXWWKHGRFWULQHUDWKHURSHUDWLQJRQWKHEDVLVRIVRPHFRKerent account 
of the purpose of this area of law.34 On this view, the accounts found in the case law 
are no more than an ex-post gloss applied to a decision made by other means. 
 
OTHER ACCOUNTS 
 
Various other accounts of legitimate expectations can be found outside the domestic 
case law.35 Can these alternative accounts meet the call for theory made by the 
 
29 5H\QROGV´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH3URWHFWLRQRI7UXVWLQ3XEOLF2IILFLDOVµ>@3/
 7KLV SRLQW LV ZHOO GHPRQVWUDWHG E\ (OOLRWW·V VWXG\ RI WKH GHSOR\PHQW RI WKH SKUDVH ´DEXVH RI
SRZHUµLQWKHFDVHODZLQZKLFKKHLGHQWLILHVILYHGLVWLQFWXVHV0(OOLRWW´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQV
and the Search for Principle: Reflections on Abdi & Nadarajahµ>@J.R. 281, p.284. 
30 R (Gallaher Group Ltd) v Competition and Markets Authority [2018] UKSC 25, [2018] 2 WLR 1583 [41]. 
For wider discussion on the remarks on language in this case, see: S. Daly and J. Tomlinson, 
´$GPLQLVWUDWLYH,QFRQVLVWHQF\LQWKH&RXUWVµ>@-5 
31 Nadarajah [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 [67]. 
32 Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 [67]. 
33 5H\QROGV´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH3URWHFWLRQRI7UXVWLQ3XEOLF2IILFLDOVµ>@3/
 )RUV\WK ´/HJLWLPDWH ([SHFWDWLRQV 5HYLVLWHGµ >@ -5   6 6FK¡QEHUJ Legitimate 
Expectations in Administrative Law (Oxford: OUP, 2000), p. 8. 
34 5H\QROGV´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH3URWHFWLRQRI7UXVWLQ3XEOLF2IILFLDOVµ>@3/
6HHIXUWKHUKRZ.QLJKWREVHUYHG¶>Z@KHWKHURQHWKLQNVDERXWOHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQVLQWHUPVRI
fairness [or] abuse of pRZHU«LW LVH[WUHPHO\XQOLNHO\WKDW LWZLOOSURYLGHWKHDQVZHUWRWKHFDVHDW
KDQG·VHH&-6.QLJKW ¶([SHFWDWLRQVLQ7UDQVLWLRQUHFHQWGHYHORSPHQWVLQOHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQV·
[2009] P.L. 15, 18. 
35 Those considered here are those most frequently referred to, explicitly or implicitly, in English legal 
jurisprudence and scholarship. 
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conceptual critique? 36 Three of the most prominent alternative accounts of the 
doctrine are explained and examined here: that legal certainty is the basis of the 
doctrine; that protecting legitimate expectations is a requirement of the constitutional 
principle of the Rule of Law; and that the doctrine exists in order to protect losses 
created by public authorities when expectations that have been relied upon are 
disappointed. I argue that none of these accounts offer convincing responses to the 
conceptual critique.    
 
Much of the conceptual analysis of legitimate expectations within EU law has 
revolved around the idea of legal certainty.37 Broadly stated, legal certainty requires 
that the law must provide those subject to it with the ability to regulate their own 
conduct in accordance with the law. The suggestion that promoting legal certainty is 
the purpose of legitimate expectations is powerfully stated LQ 6FKZDU]H·V OHDGLQJ
treatise on European Administrative Law, in which it is argued that that the principle of 
OHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQVKDVHPHUJHG¶DVDFRUROODU\RIWKHSULQFLSOHRIOHJDOFHUWDLQW\·38 
A review of CJEU case law indicates that the Luxembourg court views legal certainty 
and legitimate expectations as being extremely closely related, almost to the point of 
considering them to be the same thing.39 Occasional mention of legal certainty is also 
made in a number of English legitimate expectation cases.40 What does adopting a 
OHJDOFHUWDLQW\DFFRXQWRIOHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQVHQWDLO")RUGKDPVWDWHVWKDW¶>Z@KDW
is in play [in legal certainty issues] is the idea that people deserve to know where, in 
lawWKH\VWDQG·41 Popelier offers a more extensive exposition of the same core idea, 
explaining that legal certainty is designed to secure personal autonomy so that all 
people are able to make decisions relating to their future.42 It would follow from such 
broad understandings of the idea that, if promoting legal certainty is the purpose of 
the doctrine, legitimate expectations will be protected only insofar as such protection 
will enhance the overall clarity and predictability of the law. 
 
 
36 A similar inquiry, albeit within different terms, was undertaken in Schønberg, Legitimate Expectations 
in Administrative Law (2000), Ch. 1. 
37 2QWKH¶FRQQHFWHG·SULQFLSOHVof legal certainty and legitimate expectations in EU administrative law, 
see P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012), Ch, 18. 
38 J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law (London: 1st (English) edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 1992), p.872. 
39 e.g. Salumi v Amministrazione delle Finanze [1981] ECR 2735. 
40 Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 [29]. 
41 0)RUGKDP´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQ,,&RPSDULVRQDQG3UHGLFWLRQµ>@J.R. 262, 263 (emphasis 
added). 
42 33RSHOLHU´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH/DZ0DNHULQWKH&DVH/DZRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI
+XPDQ5LJKWVµE.H.R.L.R. 10. There are clear links between the concept of legal certainty and 
the concept of the Rule of Law here, see for example the role of legal certainty in J. Raz, The Authority of 
Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: OUP, 2009), Ch.11. On the general concept of legal certainty, 
VHHIXUWKHU+:5:DGH´7KH&RQFHSWRI/HJDO&HUWDLQW\$3UHOLPLQDU\6NLUPLVKµ0/5 
/RUG0DQFH´6KRXOGWKHODZEHFHUWDLQ"µThe Oxford Shrieval Lecture, 11 October 2011). 
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In terms of whether any fit can be established between legitimate expectation 
and legal certainty, it is readily apparent that both legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations can operate to protect individuals, and their autonomy, from arbitrary 
and unfair exercises of public powers, and occasionally the demands of both will be 
identical. It is thus difficult to deny that at least some link exists between legal certainty 
and the protection of legitimate expectations, and Reynold and Forsyth do not deny 
this too. However, this understanding of the doctrine falls down³according to the 
criteria of Forsyth and Reynolds³because legal certainty and the protection of 
legitimate expectation are separate and may conflict.43 Thomas highlights this 
SRWHQWLDOIRUFRQIOLFWH[SODLQLQJWKDW¶>O@HJDOFHUWDLQW\LVDQREMHFWLYHYDOXH«ZKHUHas 
legitimate expectations operate in the context of a specific relationship between an 
LQGLYLGXDORUDVSHFLILFFODVVDQGWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ·44  For Reynolds, the potential 
for conflict between legal certainty and the protection of expectations is perhaps best 
demonstrated by the fact that the doctrine of legitimate expectations has been 
consistently rejected by French courts, as it is understood to be incompatible with 
)UHQFKODZ·VDEVROXWHLQVLVWHQFHRQWKHprincipe de sécurité des situations juridiques.45 Put 
simply, French public law does not incorporate the protection of legitimate 
expectations in favour of prioritising certainty of the law as a whole.46 Reynolds and 
Forsyth also point to the fact that legitimate expectation and legal certainty both have 
distinct origins, despite emerging from the same legal system: both concepts originate 
from German Law and within that jurisprudence they are separate.47 Legal certainty 
is based on the principle rechtssicherheit, a principle that demands certainty of the 
content of law and is primarily employed in cases concerning retroactive law, whereas 
the protection of legitimate expectations is derived from the principle of 
vertrauensschutz, ZKLFK VHHNV WR HQVXUH WKDW ¶HYHU\RQH ZKR WUXVWV WKH OHJDOLW\ RI D
public adPLQLVWUDWLYHGHFLVLRQVKRXOGEHSURWHFWHG·48 As such, legal certainty is not 
deemed a convincing account of legitimate expectations by the conditions required by 
the conceptual critique. 
 
 
43 5H\QROGV´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH3URWHFWLRQRI7UXVWLQ3XEOLF2IILFLDOVµ>@3/
339-341. 
44 R. Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart, 2000), p.45-
46. 
45 The principle of stability of legal issues/legal certainty. 
46 Schwarze, European Administrative Law (1992), p.869. 
47 R. Errerra ´/HJLWLPDWH H[SHFWDWLRQ³Principle of Law to be Applied Only in Relation to the 
Implementation of EC Law³/HJDO&HUWDLQW\µ>@3/6FKZDU]HEuropean Administrative Law 
(1992), p 938. 
48 06FKURHGHU´$GPLQLVWUDWLYH/DZLQ*HUPDQ\µLQ56HHUGHQDQG)6WURLQNHGVAdministrative 
Law of the European Union, Its Member States and the United States - A Comparative Analysis (Antwerp: 
Intersentia Uitgevers Antwerpen, 2005), p.119. 
10 
 
Proponents of the Rule of Law account of legitimate expectation have cropped 
up both in this jurisdiction and others.49 This account conceives the doctrine as one 
aspect of the constitutional principle of the Rule of Law. In particular, there is usually 
a link drawn between the idea that the Rule of Law requires the protection of 
individual autonomy and for individuals to be able to plan ahead and foresee, with 
some degree of certainty, the consequences of their actions.50 The laws, and the public 
officials who administer them, are thus under a general obligation to ensure adequate 
predictability. From this Rule of Law requirement, we can, so the argument goes, 
justify the protection of legitimate expectations created by administration. 
  
The Rule of Law account is convincing to the extent that a purpose of the 
doctrine could said to be ensuring sufficiently stable conditions for individuals to live 
their life within. This account of the doctrine could be criticised in multiple ways, but 
its main failing on the approach of Reynolds and Forsyth would surely be that it is too 
broad.51 It is trite to observe that, despite a rich history, the Rule of Law remains a 
notoriously vague and contested concept.52 By those who believe that the Rule of Law 
LV PRUH WKDQ D ¶VHOI-FRQJUDWXODWRU\ UKHWRULFDO GHYLFH·53  different analytical 
understandings of its precise meaning are, implicitly or explicitly, developed, 
advanced, and defended.54 There is a very broad range of nuanced theories concerning 
precisely what the Rule of Law demands. The extent of that range, and the 
disagreements within it, is perhaps best seen in the well-known and significant 
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ ¶WKLQ· RU ¶IRUPDO·DQG ¶WKLFN· RU ¶VXEVWDQWLYH·DFFRXQWVRI WKH
Rule of Law.55 It follows from the evident ambiguity of the Rule of Law that it will not 
suffice to meet the conceptual critique as it cannot identify what the particular role of 
the doctrine is. Furthermore, even if it is clear that the Rule of Law demands the 
protection of legitimate expectations it will not offer practical guidance on how the 
doctrine ought to be applied. 
 
 
49 e.g. P. &UDLJ ´6XEVWDQWLYH /HJLWLPDWH ([SHFWDWLRQV DQG WKH 3ULQFLSOHV RI -XGLFLDO 5HYLHZµ LQ 0
Andenas (ed), English Public Law and the Common Law of Europe (London: Key Haven, 1998), p.23, p.45-
47; H. Woolf,  J. Jowell, A. Le Sueur, C. Donnelly and I. Hare, de 6PLWK·V-XGLFLDO5HYLHZ (London: 7th edn 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2013), p.563-564. 
50 For example, see Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (2009), Chapter 11. 
51 Some other possible criticisms of the Rule of Law account are discussed at length in Schønberg, 
Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (2000), p.12-24. 
52 -:DOGURQ´,VWKH5XOHRI/DZDQ(VVHQWLDOO\&RQWHVWHG&RQFHSW,Q)ORULGD"µLaw and 
Philosophy 137. 
53 -16KNODU´ 3ROLWLFDO7KHRU\DQGWKH5XOHRI/DZµLQ$&+XWFKLQVRQDQG30RQDKDQHGVThe Rule 
of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), p.1. 
54 An overview of the debate concerning the concept of the Rule of Law, seH-:DOGURQ´7KH5XOHRI
/DZµLQ(1=DOWDHGThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition). 
55 2QWKLVGLVWLQFWLRQVHH33&UDLJ´)RUPDODQG6XEVWDQWLYH&RQFHSWLRQVRI WKH5XOHRI/DZ$Q
$QDO\WLFDO)UDPHZRUNµ>@3/ 
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In many legitimate expectation cases, the court seems most concerned about 
SURWHFWLQJFODLPDQWV·UHOLDQFHLQWHUHVWV56 that have been either lost or affected by the 
disappointment of expectations e.g. the loss of construction costs subsequent to 
unlawfully granted planning permission.57 This is, perhaps, a corollary of the natural 
concern of the courts that the redress provided via judicial review should be as 
practically effective as possible. Can it be said, however, that the whole doctrine ought 
to be understood as a means of protecting reliance interests?58 Schønberg offers a 
possible formulation for understanding the protection of legitimate expectations in 
UHOLDQFH WHUPV D SXEOLF DXWKRULW\·V IUHHGRP WR WDNH DFWLRQ LQ WKH SXEOLF LQWHUHVW LV
limited to the extent that it causes harm to particular individuals; If a public authority 
has induced a person to rely upon its representations or conduct, realising that such 
reliance was real possibility, it is under a prima facie duty to act in such a way that the 
reliance will not be detrimental to the representee; the authority must honour the 
expectations created by its representation or, at least, compensate the person affected 
for his reliance loss.59 For Forsyth and Reynolds, such a theory of legitimate 
expectation would likely not suffice, as it seems to contradict established legal 
principle. While the presence of reliance interests in a case may lead a court to 
adopting a more rigorous approach to scrutiny of the reasons advanced by the public 
authority for disappointing an expectation, there is no strict requirement that 
detrimental reliance be present for a legitimate expectation to be protected.60 This 
position, which has recently been affirmed by the Supreme Court, undermines any 
possible account of the doctrine based on reliance interests.61  
 
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 
 
A growing school of thought amongst administrative lawyers is that the doctrine of 
legitimate expectations is about protecting trust placed in administrative bodies by 
members of the public. This is also the account of legitimate expectations that 
 
56 It could be said that there are two main forms of detriment: concrete detrimental reliance, such as the 
expenditure of money pursuant to a representation, and moral detriment, where the harm may be, for 
instance, emotional suffering. I refer at this point only to the former. 
57 D Barak-(UH]´7KH'RFWULQHRI/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH'LVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ5HOLDQFHDQG
([SHFWDWLRQ,QWHUHVWVµEuropean Public Law 583. 
58 A clear account of this idea is provided in Schønberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law 
(2000), p.9- 7KLV LGHD LV DOVR YLVLEOH LQ *7 3DJRQH ´(VWRSSHO LQ 3XEOLF /DZ 7KHRU\ )DFW DQG
)LFWLRQµUniversity of New South Wales Law Journal 267, 275-5&UDQVWRQ´5HYLHZLQJ-XGLFLDO
5HYLHZµLQ*5LFKDUGson and H. Genn (eds)., Administrative Law and Government Action: The Courts and 
Alternative Mechanisms of Review (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994). 
59 Schønberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (2000), p.10, 
60 (Bibi) v Newham LBC [2001] EWCA Civ 607 [55]. See also Bancoult (No 2) [2008] UKHL 61 [60] (Lord 
+RIIPDQQZKHUHLWLVVWDWHGWKDW´>L@WLVQRWHVVHQWLDOWKDWWKHDSSOLFDQWVKRXOGKDYHUHOLHGXSRQWKH
SURPLVHWRKLVGHWULPHQWDOWKRXJKWKLVLVDUHOHYDQWFRQVLGHUDWLRQµ 
61 In the matter of an application by Geraldine Finucane for Judicial Review [2019] UKSC 7 [62] (Lord Kerr); 
[156-160] (Lord Carnwath). 
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5H\QROGVDQG)RUV\WKSXWIRUZDUG,WLVDUJXHGKHUHWKDWWKHWKHRU\IDLOVE\5H\QROGV·
DQG)RU\VWK·VRZQFULWHULDGHVSLWHWKHLUFODLPVWRWKHFRQWUDFW)LUVWLWLVLPSRUWDQWWR
explain the account in a little more detail.  
 
Over two decades ago, Forsyth highlighted how trust in government is 
essential and the, then young, doctrine of legitimate expectations was concerned with 
ensuring that trust was maintained.62 To Forsyth, the trust account of the doctrine is 
that those who have placed their trust in the promises of officials should not go 
without a remedy if that trust is breached. Wade and Forsyth further state that the 
WUXVWDFFRXQW¶FDSWXUHVSUHFLVHO\ZK\OHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQVVKRXOGEHSURWHFWHG·63 
As the literature on legitimate expectations grew and grew over the past few decades, 
more and more references to the trust appeared. Thomas, for example, noted trust as 
D¶MXVWLILFDWLRQ·IRUWKHSULQFLSOH64 and Schønberg, in a study of legitimate expectations, 
argued that the effective administration is impossible without trust.65  
 
More recently, the suggestion that the purpose of the doctrine is to protect trust 
in government appears to have gained traction. Much of the impetus for this could 
possibly be attributed to the widely-cited work of Reynolds and Forsyth. The trust 
account is now also beginning to be referred to in judgments. Perhaps the most 
important example of this, to date, is how the concept of trust has entered the 
jurisprudence of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber). In the 
Mehmood case,66 the President of the Chamber, McCloskey J, endorsed Professor 
)RUV\WK·V VWDWHPHQW WKDW ¶>J@RRG government depends upon trust between the 
governed and the governor. Unless that trust is sustained and protected officials will 
QRWEHEHOLHYHGDQGWKH*RYHUQPHQWEHFRPHVDFKRLFHEHWZHHQFKDRVDQGFRHUFLRQ·67 
0F&ORVNH\-WKHQZHQWRQWRVWDWHWKDW¶WKHtwo basic ingredients of what the law has 
come to recognise as a substantive legitimate expectation are satisfied where there is 
an unambiguous promise or assurance by a public official in which the affected citizen 
reposes trust·.68 This statement was again confirmed by McCloskey J in the Iqbal case.69  
 
:KDWSUHFLVHO\ LVPHDQWE\ ¶WUXVW· LQ WKLV FRQWH[W")RU5H\QROGV WKH LGHDRI
¶WUXVW·UHIHUVWRWKHWUXVWWKDWWKHLQGLYLGXDOSODFHVLQWKHDFWLRQVRIDSXEOLFDXWKRULW\
that induce the expectation. Thus legitimate expectations ought to be protected 
EHFDXVHWRGRRWKHUZLVHZRXOGEHWRSHUPLWDEUHDFKRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO·VWUXVWLQWKH
 
62 &)RUV\WK´7KH3URYHQDQFHDQG3URWHFWLRQRI/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVµ&/- 238. 
63 H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford: 11th edn, OUP, 2009), p.447. 
64 R. Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart, 2000), 45. 
65 Schønberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (2000), p.25. 
66 Mehmood (Legitimate Expectation) [2014] UKUT 00469 (IAC) [13]²[16]. 
67 Ibid [15], quoting Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law (11th edn, 2009), p.447. 
68 Ibid [15] (emphasis added). 
69 Iqbal (Para 322 Immigration Rules) [2015] UKUT 00434 (IAC) [11] (McCloskey J). 
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public authority.70 While the protection of legitimate expectations may serve to 
SURPRWH ¶JHQHUDO· WUXVW LQ JRYHUQPHQW VRPHWKLQJ that it has been suggested is 
essential to its effective functioning and legitimacy),71 Reynolds suggests the purpose 
RIWKHSULQFLSOHRXJKWWREHWKHSURWHFWLRQRIZKDWKHUHIHUVWRDV¶VSHFLILF·LQVWDQFHV
of trust between the state and the individual. 72 This refinement is seen as necessary as 
arguing to the contrary would be to accept that a legitimate expectation could be 
VLPSO\ DQ H[SHFWDWLRQ WKDW WKH FODLPDQW LV WUHDWHG IDLUO\ RU ¶SURSHUO\· WKHUHE\
EHFRPLQJ D FRQFHSW ZKLFK LV ¶XVHOHVVO\ RYHUH[WHQGHG·73 According to Reynolds, 
establishing the existence of a specific instance of trust to show the presence of an 
expectation is one matter but whether the court ought to afford legal protection to that 
expectation is another matter entirely.74 7KXVWKDW¶Vpecific trust exists is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient condition to establishing [the protection of] a legitimate 
H[SHFWDWLRQ·75 It follows that what need to be shown:  
 
[I]s that a relevant representation has been made by the public authority and that it has been 
received by the claimant: this will be sufficient to form a rebuttable presumption that the 
claimant trusted the public authority to stand by that representation.76 
 
$QRWKHUTXHVWLRQSURPSWHGKHUHLVZKDWVRUWRI¶UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ·LVFDSDEOHRILnducing 
¶VSHFLILF WUXVW·" )RU 5H\QROGV DQ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH ERG\·V SURPLVHV SROLFLHV DQG
practices will seemingly all suffice as long as they are capable of giving rise to a 
VSHFLILFLQVWDQFHRIWUXVW¶>L@WLVHQWLUHO\SRVVLEOHIRUDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQPDGHEy way of 
a policy statement to incite specific trust that that public official will stick to her 
ZRUG·77 
 
There is at least one crucial point where the trust account falls down by 
UHIHUHQFH WR 5H\QROGV·V DQG )RUV\WK·V RZQ FULWHULD IRU D WKHRU\ RI OHJLWLPDWe 
expectations. That problem revolves around the distinction between expecting and 
 
70 5H\QROGV´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH3URWHFWLRQRI7UXVWLQ3XEOLF2IILFLDOVµ>@3/ 
71 The idea that general public trust in government institutions is a virtue is itself a highly controversial 
FODLP,QDQDXWKRULWDWLYHZRUNRQWKHWRSLF+DUGLQDGYDQFHGWKHWKHVLVWKDW´>W@UXVWLQJLQVWLWXWLRQV
PDNHVOLWWOHVHQVHIRUPRVWSHRSOHPRVWRIWKHWLPHµVHH5+DUGLQ´ 'RZHZDQWWUXVWLQJRYHUQPHQW"µ
in M.E. Warren (ed), Democracy & Trust (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), p.23. 
72 5H\QROGV´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH3URWHFWLRQRI7UXVWLQ3XEOLF2IILFLDOVµ>@3/
343-347. 
73 Ibid, 343. 
74 Ibid, 346-347. 
75 Ibid, 344. 
76 )RU5H\QROGV´UHFHLSWµRIWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQZLOO´QHFHVVDULO\UHTXLUHWKDWWKHDSSOLFDQWXQGHUVWDQGV
the representation to the extent necessary to form a true legitimate expectation (that is one based on 
specific trust). This will not require the comprehension of complex policies but simply basic 
comprehension of the decision-maker's representation regarding the claimant (individually or as a 
FODVVµVHHLELGIRRWQRWH 
77 Ibid, 348. 
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WUXVWLQJ  7KH JHQHUDO RUGLQDU\ ODQJXDJH GHILQLWLRQ RI ¶WUXVW· LV D ILUP EHOLHI WKDW
something is reliable, true, or able.78 The general, ordinary language definition of 
¶H[SHFW·LVWRUHJDUGVRPHWKLQJDVOLNHO\79 The trust account of the doctrine ignores 
that one can expect something without trusting that it will happen. That is to say, one 
can regard something as likely to happen (and maybe even hope it will happen) 
without holding the firm belief (or trusting) that it will happen. An example helps to 
illustrate this point. Suppose that there are three housemates who, after two years of 
cohabiting, have developed a consistent practice of washing up immediately after 
each time they have cooked and eaten. If housemate X has cooked and eaten, then 
housemates Y and Z may both expect her to wash up immediately afterwards (an 
expectation that would be rooted in past, consistent practice). It is also perfectly 
possible and plausible that housemate Y does a have a firm belief (i.e. trusts) that 
housemate X will wash up. At the same time, it is equally possible and plausible that 
housemate Z has developed such firm belief about the future conduct of housemate 
X. Housemate X could have, for instance, proven to be unreliable in other interactions 
in a way which prevents housemate Z from moving beyond having an expectation to 
having a firm belief. There is, therefore, a clear gap between the concepts of trust and 
expectation. In this respect, the trust account legitimate expectation is somewhat 
artificial³despite being advanced by Reynolds and Forsyth, it seems to fail by their 
own standards for a theory as it does not relate to what the doctrine actually does. 
There are, though, two main possible rejoinders to this point which must be 
addressed.  
 
The first possible rejoinder is to argue that it ought to be a requirement, for a 
legitimate expectation claim to be valid, that a claimant has actually placed trust in a 
public authority. The problem with this line of argument is that it forces an unjustified 
distinction, potentially between similar cases, to be made between those individuals 
who have actually placed trust in a promise, policy, or practice of an administrative 
body and those that did not (and merely had an expectation). This is an arbitrary 
distinction (especially where not trusting the public authority that induced the 
expectation may, in the face of that expectation being disappointed, appear to have 
been the wiser view). Returning to the example introduced above makes this point 
clearer: in the event that housemate X does not wash up after eating, does housemate 
Y have a legitimate grievance and housemate Z not? It seems difficult to argue 
seriously that this is the case yet this first rejoinder would inevitably lead us to the 
conclusion that it is. The classic case of Coughlan also demonstrates this point.80 The 
claimant in that case was clearly nervous about the promises made by the authorities 
 
78 Oxford English Dictionary and Thesaurus (Oxford: OUP, 2007), p.1107. 
79 Ibid, p.358. 
80 Coughlan [2001] Q.B. 213. 
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and therefore deliberately sough reassurances. It would surely not vary the legal 
analysis if Miss Coughlan had ultimately continued not to be convinced of the 
DXWKRULW\·VSURPLVHVDQGQHYHUDFWXDOO\SODFHGWUXVWLQWKHP 
 
$VHFRQGSRVVLEOHUHMRLQGHUFRQFHUQVDQDSSDUHQWGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ¶WUXVW·LQ
DQ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH ERG\ DQG ¶WUXVWLQJ· WKDW WKH ERG\ ZLOO DGRSW D FHUWDLQ FRXUVH RI
action. TheUHLVFHUWDLQO\DGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHVHWZRVHQVHVRI¶WUXVW·)RULQVWDQFH 
DQLQGLYLGXDOPD\¶WUXVW·WKDWVRPHRQHZLOOEHWUD\WKHPEXWXQGHUWKRVHFRQGLWLRQV
LW ZRXOG EH XQZLVH WR ¶WUXVW· WKHP $V GLVFXVVHG DERYH 5H\QROGV VXJJHVWV WKH
purpose of legitimate expectations ought to be seen as the protection of, what he refers 
WR DV ¶VSHFLILF· LQVWDQFHV RI WUXVW EHWZHHQ WKH VWDWH DQG WKH LQGLYLGXDO81 This 
refinement is seen as necessary as arguing to the contrary would be to accept that a 
legitimate expectation could be simply an expectation that the claimant is treated 
IDLUO\RU¶SURSHUO\·WKHUHE\EHFRPLQJDFRQFHSWZKLFKLVVWUHWFKHGEH\RQGPHDQLQJ82 
It would seem, therefore, that the trust referred to by those who defend the trust 
concept aligns wiWK¶WUXVWLQJ·WKDWWKHDJHQF\ZLOODGRSWDFHUWDLQFRXUVHRIDFWLRQLQ
particular circumstances. It is this sort of trust³ZKLFKXOWLPDWHO\UHODWHVWRRQH·VYLHZ
as to the probability of a particular eventuality³to which the above critique of the 
trust account, it has been suggested, undermines.  
 
The trust account of the doctrine is therefore artificial as it does not adequately 
connect with how the doctrine applies in reality. Such a conclusion does not undercut 
the fact that in many cases the desire to protect specific instances of trust in public 
authorities may provide powerful normative justification for the protection of 
legitimate expectations³in many cases, it is evident it does. What we are left with 
now, however, is no satisfactory response to the conceptual critique as it is expressed 
by Reynolds and Forsyth. 
 
DOING DIFFERENT THEORY 
 
If the search for theory in response to the conceptual critique has failed to provide a 
compelling answer, are the assumptions underlying the conceptual critique correct? 
In the final two parts of this article I revisit two key assumptions of the critique; 
namely, that there is a need for the particular sort of theory scholars such as Reynolds 
and Forsyth suggest and there is a pressing need in this area for more theory. It is 
suggested both of these assumptions are not necessarily correct.  
 
 
81 5H\QROGV´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH3URWHFWLRQRI7UXVWLQ3XEOLF2IILFLDOVµ>@3/
343-347. 
82 Ibid, 343. 
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In response to the failure to find a solution which fits the conceptual critique, it 
could be argued that it is important to continue the search for some meta-value that 
ZLOO ¶SURvide invaluable guidance to difficult questions concerning the scope and 
HIIHFW RI WKH GRFWULQH·83 In other words, once the core normative function of the 
doctrine is understood then guidance about how present controversies are to be 
resolved can be uncovered. The problem here is that such a search does not, as the 
above analysis demonstrates, appear to yield an obvious answer. It also seems 
unlikely some presently unknown and compelling account of the doctrine will 
somehow emerge.  
 
Another response is to argue a different type of theory is more viable. More 
specifically, we need to depart from some or all of the criteria that Reynolds and 
Forsyth appear to suggest are required of a theory in the context of legitimate 
H[SHFWDWLRQV7KLVLV3DXO'DO\·VDSSURach to building an account of the purpose of 
legitimate expectations.84 Jettisoning the approach of Reynold and Forsyth, Daly has 
SURYLGHG D ¶YDOXH SOXUDOLVW DFFRXQW· RI OHJLWLPDWH H[SHFWDWLRQ ZKLFK ¶UDWKHU WKDQ
assigning priority to any one value²or casting about for an alternative meta-value that 
is not easily found in the FDVHV· LQVWHDG ¶DWWHPSWV WR DFFRPPRGDWH WKHP DOO
UHFRQFLOLQJWKHPZKHUHQHFHVVDU\·85 On this value pluralist approach, it is accepted 
that multiple normative values underpin the protection of legitimate expectations and 
where, in particular cases, those values conflict (both with each other and with values 
related to, for instance, wider constitutional norms), reconciliation must be sought as 
far as is possible.  
 
This value pluralist approach is more viable for a range of reasons. It is only 
normal that WKH¶GRFWULQHPD\QRWPDSFOHDUO\RQWRWKHYDULRXVMXVWLILFDWLRQVRIIHUHG
IRULWIURPWLPHWRWLPH·86 This approach also seems to more closely reflect that the 
doctrine applies in a wide range of factual scenarios spanning the vast functions of the 
modern administrative state. Given that it is a general principle of judicial review with 
broad application, it is inevitably the case that various values will be in play, or be less 
or more significant, in different legitimate expectations cases.87 Furthermore, the 
GRFWULQHLV¶VWLOOGHYHORSLQJ·88 and is part of a wider system of judicial review that is 
 
83 Ibid, 330. 
84 3'DO\´$3OXUDOLVW$FFRXQWRI'HIHUHQFHDQG/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVµ. 
85 Ibid, p.111, citing the influence of S.R. Munzer, A Theory of Property (Cambridge, CUP 1990). The 
FRQFHSWRI¶SOXUDOLVP·LVPXFK-debated within legal theory. Here, however, it is simply a term used, as 
Daly uses it, to refer to the presence of more than one normative value. 
86 Ibid, p101. 
87 P. Cane, Administrative Law (Oxford: 5th edn OUP, 2011), p.9-11; AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM 
Advocate [2011] UKSC 4 [170] (Lord Reed). 
88 Rowland v Environment Agency [2003] EWCA Civ 1885 [100] (May LJ). 
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constantly evolving.89 Like every new doctrine, especially of common law origin, 
OHJLWLPDWH H[SHFWDWLRQV ¶KDV QRW IROORZHG LQH[RUDEO\ IURP DQ DJUHHG VHW RI ILUVW
prLQFLSOHV· QRU FRXOG LW EH UHDVRQDEO\ H[SHFWHG WR90 The doctrine of legitimate 
expectations also imposes both procedural and substantive restrictions on 
administrative power. Cases involving substantive expectations typically involve 
different normative values³or, at least, differing emphasis on certain values³than 
cases involving procedural expectations.91 This was demonstrated, for instance, 
WKURXJKKRZWKHFRXUWV¶KDGOLWWOHGLIILFXOW\LQUHFRJQLVLQJWKHH[LVWHQFHRISURFHGXUDO
OHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQV·92 but underwent some degree of turmoil in deciding to accept 
the protection of substantive legitimate expectations. This therefore seems a more 
realistic approach to theory building in respect of legitimate expectations, if we 
wanted to build one.  
 
DOING MORE THAN THEORY 
 
A more pressing response, I would argue, to the question of whether we need a theory 
of legitimate expectations³one which goes to the heart of contemporary 
administrative law scholarship³is whether there is a need for more theory in this area 
DW DOO" , ZRXOG VXJJHVW WKH DQVZHU LV ¶QR· &RQWHPSRUDU\ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH ODZ
scholarship contains two serious imbalances, both of which are embodied in the 
conceptual critique.  
 
The first imbalance evident in this debate is a focus on common law principles 
as applied in judicial review. There is well-established critique of the dominant mode 
of administrative law scholarship in England and Wales: the vast majority of the 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHMXVWLFHV\VWHPLVEH\RQGLWV¶KRUL]RQ·93 Study generalist or specialist 
scholarly journal that features public law work, and there is a high possibility that any 
public law commentary to be found focuses on judicial doctrine. Indeed, the term 
¶DGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZ·LVRIWHQHTXDWHGZLWKRQO\WKHSULQFLSOHVRIMXGLFLDOUHYLHZThis 
could be seen as odd given the volume of cases dealt with in other parts of the system. 
Public authorities (broadly defined) take millions of decisions each year,94 and it has 
long been observed that much of that decision-making involves an interpretation of 
 
89 Council of Civil Service Unions [1985] AC 374, 414 (Lord Roskill). 
90 3'DO\´$3OXUDOLVW$FFRXQWRI'HIHUHQFHDQG/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVµS 
91 Ibid, p.102. 
92 3&UDLJ´6XEVWDQWLYH/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQV LQ'RPHVWLFDQG&RPPXQLW\/DZµ&/- 
289, 290. 
93 *5LFKDUGVRQDQG+*HQQ´7ULEXQDOV LQWUDQVLWLRQUHVROXWLRQRUDGMXGLFDWLRQ"µ>@3/ 116, 
118-119. 
94 For an overview of initial decision-making volume and trends, see R. Thomas and J. Tomlinson, 
´0DSSLQJ FXUUHQW LVVXHV LQ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH MXVWLFH DXVWHULW\ DQG WKH ¶PRUH EXUHDXFUDWLF UDWLRQDOLW\·
DSSURDFKµ Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 380. 
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legal norms.95 Even in the realm of dispute resolution, judicial review is marginal. 
Administrative review³that is, internal reconsideration by the relevant decision-
maker³is now the largest public law dispute mechanism.96 Tribunals³which are 
recognised judicial bodies³have long determined many more cases than judicial 
review does.97 To be clear, there is not a near-obsessive focus on judicial review in 
administrative law scholarship, there is a near-obsessive focus on just the principles 
of judicial decision-making within judicial review. Many scholars have much to say 
about reasonableness, proportionality, procedural fairness etc. Comparatively little 
has been said about the rest of judicial review as a process.98 Furthermore, the 
scholarship is primarily centred on the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court³courts 
which, by the nature of their permission criteria alone, deal with exceptional cases. 
The Administrative Court has consistently been marginalised in the vast majority of 
scholarship (which is, of course, not the only venue for judicial review: various 
tribunals have powers of judicial review).99 Even within the discussion of judicial 
principles, some areas are debated almost endlessly while other areas relatively 
neglected. There has, for instance, been a swell of literature on substantive review.100 
At the same time, remarkably little has been said about the general principles of 
statutory interpretation in a public law context.101 This is so in the face of the fact that 
the overwhelming majority of judicial reviews are claims about straightforward 
interpretation of an Act of Parliament or secondary legislation. These are entrenched 
oddities of scholarly perspective in contemporary administrative law.  
 
The second imbalance on display in the debate about the conceptual critique is 
that, within its often extremely narrow focus, much of the debate around legal 
 
95 There has been much more work on this in the US than UK, e.g. -/0DVKDZ´%HWZHHQ)DFWVDQG
1RUPV6WDWXWRU\,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRI$JHQF\1RUPVDVDQ$XWRQRPRXV(QWHUSULVHµ87/- 497. 
The core observations are not new, though, see B. Wyman, The Principles of the Administrative Law 
Governing the Relations of Public Officers (1903). 
96 7KRPDVDQG7RPOLQVRQ´0DSSLQJFXUUHQWLVVXHVLQDGPLQLVWUDWLYHMXVWLFHDXVWHULW\DQGWKH¶PRUH
EXUHDXFUDWLFUDWLRQDOLW\·DSSURDFKµ Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 380, 389-392. 
97 57KRPDV´&XUUHQW'HYHORSPHQWV LQ8.7ULEXQDOV&KDOOHQJHVIRU$GPLQLVWUDWLYH-XVWLFHµ LQ6
Nason (ed.), Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative Perspectives (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 2017). 
98 There are, of course, some important exceptions, e.g. 55DZOLQJV´ 0RGHOOLQJ-XGLFLDO5HYLHZµ
61(1) Current Legal Problems 95; M. Sunkin and V. Bondy, The Dynamic of Judicial Review Litigation (The 
Public Law Project, 2009); R. Thomas, ´0DSSLQJ,PPLJUDWLRQ-XGLFLDO5HYLHZ/LWLJDWLRQ$Q(PSLULFDO
/HJDO$QDO\VLVµ>@3/ 
99 61DVRQ´5HJLRQDOLVDWLRQRIWKH$GPLQLVWUDWLYH&RXUWDQGWKH7ULEXQDOLVDWLRQRI-XGLFLDO5HYLHZµ
[2009] P.L. 440. 
100 For which I am partly responsible, see: J:5\ODWWDQG-7RPOLQVRQ´ 6RPHWKLQJ1HZLQ6XEVWDQWLYH
5HYLHZµ>@J.R. 204. For an exasperated overview of the debate, see /RUG&DUQZDWK´)URPMXGLFLDO
outrage to sliding scales³where next for Wednesbury"µ$/%$/HFWXUH1RYHPEHU 
101 Lots of discussion has focused on the Human Rights Act 1998 and hard cases such as R (Evans) v 
Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21, where fundamental constitutional norms are said to be engaged, but 
there has been little said about routine cases involving statutory interpretation. 
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principle trades on abstractions. Public law in the UK was, historically, said to be anti-
theoretical. In the past few decades, there has been a huge growth in the role of 
theory.102 Administrative law in particular has also seen the effects of the influence of 
theory.103 One of the effects of an increased connection with theory has been an ever-
increasing focus on the abstract.  
 
Various scholars have warned about over-relying on abstractions. It was a 
concern widely voiced by scholars of the functionalist style, which consistently 
cautioned of the dangers of getting bound up in concepts at the expense of material 
substance.104 As the new millennium came, the functionalist style declined but the 
complaint about the use of abstractions did not go away. The main critique regarding 
the role of abstraction in public law thought appears now to be emanating from 
Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber. Their first crack at the problems with abstraction 
ZDVDQDUWLFOHRQ WKH ¶JUDPPDU·RISXEOLF ODZ105 7KH\REVHUYH WKDW WKH ¶dominant 
JUDPPDU·RISXEOLF ODZ LV D ¶SURGXFWRI DEVWUDFWLRQ WKDW DW WLPHVRYHUHPSKDVL]HV
certainty and simplicity in a search for systematic coherence within the constitution, 
HYHQZKHUHQRQHH[LVWV·106 This argument is made in the context of the scholarship of 
prominent political constitutionalists, but the particular concern about abstraction 
ZDVJLYHQIXOOHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQLQDODWHUDUWLFOHRQ¶UDWLRQDOLVP·LQSXEOLFODZ107 This 
work articulated many of the old functionalist concerns about abstraction through the 
framework of conservative philosopher Michael Oakeshott.108 While abstractions 
have their place, having so much administrative law scholarship trade in the abstract 
means that practice can be³and has been³left understudied and not properly taken 
into account.109  
 
The conceptual critique of legitimate expectations is an artefact of both of these 
major imbalances in contemporary administrative law thought. It, first, represents the 
focus on common law principles as applied in judicial review. The sheer amount of 
literature produced on legitimate expectations highlights this. As the case law 
 
102 7KLVLVFRPPRQO\REVHUYHG)RUDJRRGDFFRXQWVHH**HHDQG*:HEEHU´5DWLRQDOLVPLQ3XEOLF
/DZµM.L.R. 708. 
103 M. Taggart, ¶3UROHJRPHQRQWRDQLQWHOOHFWXDOKLVWRU\RIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZLQWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\
the FDVHRI-RKQ:LOOLVDQG&DQDGLDQDGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZ·Osgoode Hall Law Journal 223, 229. 
104 0/RXJKOLQ´7KH)XQFWLRQDOLVW6W\OHLQ3XEOLF/DZµ87/- 
105 **HHDQG*:HEEHU´$*UDPPDURI3XEOLF/DZµGerman Law Journal 2137. I have built 
RQ VLPLODU WKHPHV LQ DQ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH MXVWLFH FRQWH[W VHH - 7RPOLQVRQ ´7KH *UDPPDU RI
$GPLQLVWUDWLYH-XVWLFH9DOXHVµJournal of Social Welfare and Family Law 524. 
106 *HHDQG:HEEHU´$*UDPPDURI3XEOLF/DZµGerman Law Journal 2137, 2137. 
107 *HHDQG:HEEHU´5DWLRQDOLVPLQ3XEOLF/DZµ0/5 
108 M. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991). 
109 *HHDQG:HEEHU´5DWLRQDOLVPLQ3XEOLF/DZµ0/56HHDOVR &+DUORZ´3ROLWLFV
DQGSULQFLSOHVVRPHULYDOWKHRULHVRIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZµModern Law Review 113, 117. 
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developed, myriad articles and books were produced.110 At least from one 
perspective, there is a serious sense of disproportion here: there are, collectively, more 
monographs, journal articles, and book chapters considering the potential perils of the 
doctrine of substantive expectations than there are cases where a public authority has 
been directed to act in line with its earlier representation.111 In the swelling literature, 
little has been said about how other administrative justice systems manage situations 
where representations are disappointed.112 Ombudsmen, for instance, seem an 
institution which may be well placed to practically resolve grievances of this sort but 
are not adequately discussed.113 The conceptual critique also plainly emphasises the 
abstract. The conceptual critique is perhaps the most excessive example of this, but 
nearly all debate has neglected practice in favour of more abstract debate. There has 
been scholarship on distinguishing sources of legitimate expectations,114 comparative 
doctrinal scholarship,115 discussion about judicial power and the clarity of 
principles,116 discussion of how cases can be conFHSWXDOO\ ¶PDSSHG·117 and much 
more. All of this has been going on while administrative law scholars have accepted 
entirely a deficient account of the practical aspects and impacts of the doctrine.118  
 
To be clear, it is not my contention that it is a failing that we have a conceptually 
advanced and lively debate. Rather, the contention is that it is an egregious failing of 
scholarship that the conceptual debate is so advanced while, at the same time, our 
scholarship generally lacks accounts of the overall outcomes of legitimate expectations 
claims, what actually determines those outcomes (which may well be disconnected 
from what judges say to be deciding factors), the potentially multifaceted impacts of 
WKHGRFWULQHRQJRYHUQPHQW WKHGRFWULQH·V OLNHO\YDULDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQ LQGLIIHUHQW
policy sectors, how other administrative justice systems deal with expectation-type 
grievances, and many other aspects of the material conditions and consequences of 
 
110 There have now been at least five full-length books on legitimate expectations. 
111 At least in the English and Welsh jurisdiction. See generally, 57KRPDV´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQV
DQGWKH6HSDUDWLRQRI3RZHUVLQ(QJOLVKDQG:HOVK$GPLQLVWUDWLYH/DZµLQ0*URYHVDQG*:HHNV
(eds), Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World (Oxford: Hart, 2017). 
112 The best analysis of alternative systems is contained in a practice text, see Moules, Actions Against 
Public Officials: Legitimate Expectations, Misstatements and Misconduct (2009), Ch.1, Ch.9, Ch.10. 
113 Moules, Actions Against Public Officials: Legitimate Expectations, Misstatements and Misconduct (2009), 
Ch. 10. 
114 e.g. 5&OD\WRQ´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQV3ROLF\DQGWKH3ULQFLSOHRI&RQVLVWHQF\µC.L.J. 
93. 
115 e.g. M. Groves and G. Weeks (eds), Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World (Oxford: Hart 
2017); A.K. Sperr and D. Hohenlohe-Oehringen (eds), The Protection of Legitimate Expectations in 
Administrative Law: A Comparative Study (Oxford: Hart, forthcoming). 
116 e.g. )RUV\WK´ /HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQV5HYLVLWHGµ>@-5; &6WHZDUW´ 6XEVWDQWLYH8QIDLUQHVV
$1HZ6SHFLHVRI$EXVHRI3RZHU"µFederal Law Review 617. 
117 e.g. -9DUXKDV´,Q6HDUFKRID'RFWULQH0DSSLQJWKH/DZRI/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVµLQ M Groves 
and G Weeks (eds), Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World (Oxford: Hart, 2017). 
118 There are some notable but very rare exceptions, e.g. 57KRPDV´/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVDQGWKH
6HSDUDWLRQRI3RZHUVLQ(QJOLVKDQG:HOVK$GPLQLVWUDWLYH/DZµ 
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the doctrine. This situation is made even more disconcerting by the fact that many of 
the claims involved in the existing literature depend on empirical claims and other 
processes outside of judicial review.  
 
These tendencies are also reflected elsewhere in the legitimate expectations 
scholarship. Take, for instance, the concern about substantive expectations 
representing a worrying extension of judicial power. Many critics of substantive 
legitimate expectations consider themselves as such because they fear that the 
doctrine represents the judiciary straying beyond their appropriate institutional and 
constitutional limits.119 Much of that critique is premised on discussions in judgments. 
Certainly, what is said in judgments is of crucial importance in advancing and 
assessing claims about increased and potentially excessive judicial power. But this is 
only one means of assessing judicial power. Another means is looking at outcomes i.e. 
the eventual results that the cases have actually brought about. If one was to advance 
a claim about a legal principle usurping the decision-making powers of public 
authorities, it would be of great concern³perhaps of greater concern than what is 
merely said in judgments³to build a detailed account about the extent to which such 
powers are actually usurped in practice through the outcomes of cases. The fact this 
is lacking in the scholarship is indicative of the general neglect of practice in this area. 
 
Another example can be seen in how a growing chorus of public lawyers are 
now arguing that there is a need to disaggregate different doctrines that supposedly 
lie within what we currently call legitimate expectations. The core contention here, as 
-DVRQ9DUXKDVKDVSXWLWLV¶WKDWFRXUWVKDYHRIWHQDQDO\VHGFDVHVLQWHUPVRIOHJLWLPDWH
expectations, which are not properly analysed as such, and more appropriately 
DQDO\VHGE\UHIHUHQFHWRRWKHUUHYLHZGRFWULQHV·120 Rebecca Williams makes much the 
VDPHSRLQWLQKHUDUJXPHQWWKDWZHRXJKWWR¶UHDOLVHWKDWWKHUHPD\LQIDFWEHWKUHH
different varieties of legitimate expectation, which have different conceptual and 
QRUPDWLYH EDVHV ZKLFK WKXV UHTXLUH GLIIHUHQW ¶LQJUHGLHQWV· WR EH PDGH RXW E\ WKH
FODLPDQWDQGZKLFKFDQHDFKEHSURWHFWHGLQDYDULHW\RIZD\V·121 While this argument 
does not carry the exact same flaw as the conceptual critique addressed above³
though it may carry others122³it does reveal a similar attempt to analyse 
 
119 e.g. )RUV\WK ¶/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQV5HYLVLWHG·>@ -52QWKH LGHDRI WKHFRXUWVKDYLQJ
FRQVWLWXWLRQDODQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOOLPLWDWLRQVVHH--RZHOO´2I9LUHVDQG9DFXXPV7KH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO
&RQWH[WRI-XGLFLDO5HYLHZµin C. Forsyth (ed), Judicial Review and the Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2000), 
p.330. 
120 -9DUXKDV´,Q6HDUFKRID'RFWULQH0DSSLQJWKH/DZRI/HJLWLPDWH([SHFWDWLRQVµLQ M Groves and 
G Weeks (eds), Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World (Oxford: Hart, 2017), p.18. 
121 5:LOOLDPV´7KHPXOWLSOHGRFWULQHVRIOHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQVµ>@/45p.639. 
122 See e.g. 3&UDLJ´7D[RQRP\DQG3XEOLF/DZ$5HVSRQVHµ>@3/IRUWKFRPLQJ 
22 
 
administrative law through isolating common law principles and side-lining their 
function vis-à-vis administration and in practice more generally.123 
 
Given these two imbalances, there is no pressing need to argue for more theory 
in administrative law³at very least, there is no pressing need for theory in respect of 
legitimate expectations as Forsyth and Reynolds contend.124 On the contrary, 
contemporary administrative law scholarship is dominated by a focus on both 
common law principles applied in judicial review (with a corresponding neglect of 
the rest of the administrative justice system) and the abstract (with a corresponding 
neglect of practice). The pressing need in contemporary administrative law 
scholarship is for an account of the practice of legitimate expectations in the wider 
context of public administration. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has followed the prominent articulations of the conceptual critique of 
legitimate expectations. In particular, it followed the arc of the arguments offered by 
Forsyth and Reynolds, both of whom suggest that the doctrine would be assisted by 
identification RIVRPHVRUWRI¶PHWD-YDOXH·,Whas shown that no account of the purpose 
of protecting legitimate expectations convincingly responds to the conceptual critique: 
each of them, even the alternative theories proposed by such critics, fail as compelling 
¶PHWD-YDOXHV·IRU the doctrine. As an alternative, it has been suggested that developing 
a value pluralist account of the doctrine may be a preferable approach. More 
significantly, this article has raised the question of whether building a theory of 
legitimate expectations ought to be a priority for administrative lawyers. Increasingly 
complex debates about why legitimate expectations ought to be protected have been 
going on while administrative law scholars have accepted entirely deficient accounts 
of the practice of the doctrine and its role in wider context of public administration. 
On this basis, it has been suggested that constructing theories of legitimate 
expectation³though they may have use³ought to be of secondary importance to 
constructing an empirical account of the conditions and effects of legitimate 
expectations. The alternative path is to continue to expand a theoretically refined body 
of scholarship with a baked-in ignorance of practice. 
  
 
123 Some attempts are made to connect with public administration, but they are fleeting. For instance, 
see: R. Williams, ´7KHPXOWLSOHGRFWULQHVRIOHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQVµ p.652-653. 
124 The suggestion here is that the example of legitimate expectations is representative of administrative 
law scholarship more generally. As noted above, a much broader study would be required to 
systematically demonstrate that thesis. 
